Thinking in Public | Emran Yasser Moustafa

After being pointed towards Adam Stokes’ essays on techno-crofting, I was motivated by his thinking in public style of writing to write the blog post you are reading now. The following is a living document: some questions about the world, and things I’m interested in, that I haven’t been able to answer myself. Most are on topics “outside of my area” — as much as I hate that phrase. So if you are more knowledgeable on these things, please do get in touch for a chat. Beers on me.

Is the Digital Markets Act the EU pushing back against technofeudalism, or quietly defending a cloud fiefdom of its own?

After seeing yet another instance of the Digital Markets Act being turned on US tech — most recently the €890 million (~$1bn) fine handed to Google in July 2026 for self-preferencing its own services in Search and the Play Store — my first instinct was an image of a courageous EU hacking away at the outstretched tentacles of a swelling, US-based cloud octopus, à la Standard Oil. Obviously not biased. But is that what’s actually happening? Is the EU genuinely refusing to prop up the cloud capitalists? Or is it clearing room for cloud capitalists of its own? I keep coming back to the EU’s push for home-grown alternatives to US tech, like Wero, the European Payments Initiative’s would-be rival to Visa and Mastercard.

The people yearn for masquerade

Recently, I visited the Kelvingrove Art Gallery and Museum in Glasgow with my girlfriend. There was a small exhibit tucked away in the corner, behind some stuffed giraffes and a family of ocelots, on ritual masks from different cultures around the world. From reading the cards, it seemed that most rituals these masks were involved in were significantly centred around both 1) dance and community trance, like rituals involving a suspension of reality, and 2) the wearer doing some form of mystic transmutation into another being, for purposes of supporting the ritual.

It was a great exhibit, and got me thinking of other rituals I’ve seen of this form from around the world. Examples being the Irish tradition of the Wren Boys, the Hungarian Busójárás, or the tons of African trance-transmutation rituals (see Zangbeto as an example). It seems to me this core idea is ubiquitous across cultures. And at least on a surface level to a know-nothing like me, it seems like they all serve as some form of pressure valve for the community — whether that be warding off “evil spirits” or bringing in blessings or whatever.

So anthropologists, why does it seem to me that such traditions have ceased in the modern world? Or have they? I guess people go through a form of transmutation when they become a Laker, or furries. I see hints of this idea in things like club culture or entertainment-fuelled idolatry, but they seem to be missing this core sense of mysticism, anonymity, and transmutation that appears to be present in all of these examples around the world. Is this just pre- vs post-enlightenment? What is up here?

Did control over southern Lebanon really outweigh the damage done to one of Israel’s few remaining allies?

So I believe at this point in the conflict it’s quite clear that Israel’s pressure on America to initiate this conflict was largely to weaken Iran-backed Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, and in turn claim territory in the area. That narrative seems relatively well-established given all of the information available at time of writing. What also seems clear is that America has taken a large chunk of hurt in this conflict; in terms of the financial burdens on its citizens, political costs to their relationships with allies and adversaries, tangible military costs largely in the form of critically depleted munitions, etc.

Holding these two things in mind, my query lies in the math of the whole situation. From Israel’s perspective, as a government quickly losing favour worldwide and with its own citizens, did the gains in the form of control over southern Lebanon really outweigh the damage to one of its few remaining allies? How does that math check out, or am I missing something important here? Is it really the case that they believed the whole conflict would be over and done with quickly, like the Twelve-Day War back in June 2025?

Does more drones mean more détente?

So hear this out. There’s been much chat about this concept of “attacker’s advantage” with reference to cybersecurity — primarily in light of the capability of frontier AI models to hack seemingly everyone and everything.

Thinking more about this concept, attacker’s advantage appears also to be on display from a national defence perspective, with regards to nations’ ability to mobilise large numbers of cheap drones and robots to attack the things (infrastructure, soldiers, etc.) of those they don’t like, while stopping them requires significantly more expensive defensive technologies. This is problematic. I guess also, just in the context of US-Iran conflicts and potentially further US conflicts with “less powerful” entities, the playing field is not level with regards to perceptions of the war and its consequences.

Wealthy hegemons like the US seem to be at the mercy of others armed with a fraction of the budget, with their economic and political order at stake. Billion dollar aircraft carriers held at bay by guerilla fighters, by the fear that the drones that do get through cause outsized damage. The same can be seen with Russia I imagine, where an economic superpower is being throttled by cheap attacks on infrastructure that seem to have outsized devastating impacts on their economy. I’m reminded of the Henry Kissinger quote:

The guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win.

So with this advantage in the hands of smaller nations over larger ones, and the resulting economic realities of warfare at present, how does this impact the politics of détente and deterrence? From my naive understanding of things, stronger players exert force on weaker players through the threat of violence, and as such get the big seats at the table. Previously, détente wasn’t as big a card in the playbook for these small fry. Is this to change, and if so how? I would imagine that this is particularly prominent for nations to which a ground invasion is unlikely or unviable — Afghanistan, the Houthis, Pakistan (?), Taiwan (?).